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ABSTRACT
This article att empts to shed light on the political economy of the Malaysian 
state governments’ budgetary behaviour by tailoring hypotheses drawn from 
recent theoretical literature to the Malaysian institutional context and testing 
them empirically. The main objective here was to examine whether state 
governments’ fi scal behaviour can partly be explained by the political att ributes 
and the institutional characteristics of the government, and of the legislature. In 
particular, the study analysed whether the incentives for the state governments 
to observe a prudent spending behaviour have not been undermined by the fact 
that they have been able to infl uence relevant central government decisions 
regarding their fi nance. The estimation results showed that states that are 
over-represented at the executive level tend to have higher spending and 
defi cits. However, no correlation was found between over-representation at the 
parliament and state governments’ fi scal outcomes. This can be explained by 
the fact that in Malaysia, as is frequently the case in developing nations, the 
legislature is peripheral to the executive in terms of decision-making power.
Keywords: State governments; fi scal behaviour; political economy.
    
ABSTRAK
Artikel ini membincangkan gelagat fi skal kerajaan negeri di Malaysia dari 
sudut politik ekonomi. Berdasarkan kepada teori ekonomi politik, penulis 
cuba untuk menganalisa secara empirikal situasi di Malaysia. Objektif utama 
artikel ini adalah untuk melihat sejauh mana gelagat fi skal kerajaan negeri di 
Malaysia dipengaruh oleh atribut politik serta karakteristik institusi kerajaan 
dan legislatur. Secara lebih khususnya, penulis cuba melihat keupayaan 
kerajaan negeri untuk mempengaruhi keputusan yang dibuat oleh kerajaan 
persekutuan dan sejauh mana ianya akan mempengaruhi gelagat fi skal kerajaan 
negeri. Hasil dapatan kajian menunjukkan negeri yang mempunyai wakil yang 
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ramai di Kabinet akan mempunyai tingkat perbelanjaan dan defi sit yang lebih 
tinggi. Walau bagaimanapun, penulis tidak menemui sebarang hubungan 
yang signifi kan di antara perbelanjaan dan jumlah wakil di Parlimen. Penulis 
merasakan ini sama seperti kebanyakkan negara-negara membangun yang lain, 
kuasa membuat keputusan di peringkat kerajaan persekutuan lebih tertumpu di 
pihak kabinet. 
Kata kunci: Kerajaan negeri; gelagat fi skal; ekonomi politik.
 
INTRODUCTION
The fi rst generation of economic theories of fi scal federalism generated 
much optimism about decentralisation in the form of bett er improvement 
in effi  ciency, accountability, and governance. However, these theories 
seemed to be increasingly anachronistic in the face of subnational 
debt accumulation and bailouts, as well as evidence of corruption and 
ineffi  ciency associated with decentralisation. According to Rodden 
(2005), the failure of the prevailing literature to describe the reality of 
decentralisation is due notably to the absence of the political dimension 
in its analysis. As a result, a new wave of scholarship where political 
variables are given centre stage has emerged (Bellefl amme & Hindriks, 
2003; Besley & Coate, 2003; Bordignon, Cerniglia, & Revelli, 2004; Hindriks 
& Lockwood, 2005; Persson & Tabellini, 2000). A major assumption 
underlying the new political economy literature is that politicians are 
primarily interested in maintaining and enhancing their political careers. 
Most importantly, in these models, government decisions are viewed as 
bargains struck among self-interested politicians att empting to form 
winning coalitions, rather than refl ections on the optimal provision of 
collective goods or the internalisation of externalities. Consequently, the 
central government is no longer autonomously able to alter subnational 
policies as it will have to bargain with subnational governments in order 
to gain support from all or at least some minimum fraction of them. 
This paper highlights the political economy of the Malaysian state 
governments’ budgetary behaviour by tailoring hypotheses drawn from 
recent theory literature to the Malaysian institutional context and testing 
them empirically. The main objective here is to examine whether state 
governments’ fi scal behaviour can partly be explained by the political 
att ributes and the institutional characteristics of the government and of 
the legislature. In particular, it was analysed whether the incentives for 
the state governments to observe a prudent spending behaviour have not 
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been undermined due to the fact that they have been able to infl uence 
relevant central government decisions regarding their fi nance. There are 
basically two hypotheses that was tested in this study: Do states with 
the most votes (or the strongest representation) in parliament or in the 
government have relatively higher spending and run a larger defi cit? 
And do states that share the same ideological leaning as the central 
government have relatively higher spending and run a larger defi cit? The 
reason being, a highly infl uential state in the sense that they are highly 
represented in the government or share the same political ideology as 
the central government, face weaker incentives to be fi scally responsible 
as it has higher probability of obtaining extra allocations from the central 
government and in case of a crisis, is more likely to be rescued. 
The paper is organised as follows. The second section provides a more 
detailed discussion on the links between political factors and economics, 
as well as fi scal outcomes at the subnational level by reviewing the work 
that had been done both by economists and political scientist in this 
area. Section 3 discusses the econometric approach that was adopted. 
The results of the estimations is presented and discussed in section 4 and 
fi nally, section 5 concludes.
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE
In many countries (and in particular federal countries), the structure 
of the central government includes representation of the subnational 
units. Theoretical as well as empirical studies pointed to the fact 
that central government decisions, especially those that concern the 
interests of subnational units, will be subject to the infl uences of this 
representation both at the legislative and executive levels. Nevertheless, 
researchers tend to privilege the former as the main arena where self-
interested politicians strike bargains among themselves. This focus on 
the legislature has given rise to the term “legislative bargaining” which 
is usually used in complement to other terms such as “logrolling” or 
“pork-barrel”1. Indeed, representatives of the states or regions at the 
legislature will engage in a bargaining process among themselves which 
will usually end up with some of them logrolling their votes in order to 
achieve passage of pork-barrel projects. 
Decision-making concerning distributive policies2 constitutes a good 
example of legislative bargaining at work. By defi nition, distributive 
politics is a political decision that concentrates benefi ts in a specifi c 
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geographic district or region, and fi nances expenditure through 
generalised taxation3.  The fact that these policies are distributive in nature 
implies that with the majority rule, there will be no voting equilibrium 
and Condorcet cycles will unavoidably emerge. There are mainly two 
views regarding the legislative passing of redistributive policies – the 
minimum winning coalitions and the universal and oversized coalitions. 
Another strand in the literature of distributive politics consists in testing 
the “Law of 1/n” proposed by Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), 
according to whom the level of distributive spending is positively linked 
with the number of legislators (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, & Sigelman, 
2002; Huriochi & Lee, 2004; Milesi-Ferett i, Perott i, & Rostagno, 2001; 
Rodden & Arretche, 2004). The mechanism at work according to the 
authors is the common pool problem: since each group fully benefi ts 
from its specifi c spending programme but the burden of taxation is 
diff used, the cost of public expenditures is not fully internalised by the 
political decision-makers and thus could lead to greater-than-optimal 
public expenditures. 
The legislature is not the sole channel through which subnational units 
can exert its infl uences on the central government’s decision-making. 
In Canada for instance, regions do not have any formal legislative 
representation. However, it does not prevent some regions from 
obtaining special treatment from the federal government. For example, 
in 2004, Ontario was awarded a grant of CAD 5.75 billion in response 
to Premier McGuinty’s cry that Ontario was paying more than its fair 
share into the federation. Nevertheless, no such deal was struck, or even 
discussed with Alberta, where the per capita fi scal transfer was higher 
than in Ontario.
Cox and McCubbins (1986) presented a model where electoral candidates 
compete by promising direct redistribution of welfare among the 
various groups in their constituency. The central insight of the model is 
that the type of coalition the candidates att empt to build (thus the nature 
of their distributive politics) will depend on their att itudes toward risk. 
They showed that risk-averse incumbents tend to invest most heavily 
in their closest supporters while risk-loving candidates pursue swing 
districts more aggressively, that is, districts where voters are more likely 
to evaluate the candidate in terms of actual performance in offi  ce. In a 
closely related paper on campaign spending, Snyder (1989) obtained a 
similar result  – a party that seeks to maximise the probability of winning 
a majority will spend more on safe districts, that is, where it has an overall 
advantage because these are more likely to be pivotal in obtaining the 
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majority. In contrast, Dixit and Londregan (1996) viewed voters as 
willing to compromise their party affi  nities in exchange for particularistic 
benefi ts. They also showed that candidates will aggressively court the 
swing voters through this particularistic spending.
Empirical studies usually att ribute to the fi rst model if they fi nd core 
supporters would benefi t disproportionately and to the second if swing 
voters are privileged by candidates. Given the theoretical controversy 
in the existing literature, it is perhaps not surprising that the relevant 
empirical literature has generated a confusing array of fi ndings. Some 
US studies support Dixit-Londregan thesis that material benefi ts are 
disproportionately directed to swing voters (Bickers & Stein, 1996; 
Herron & Theodos, 2004). Some research in other national sett ings also 
found that legislators direct resources to electorally pivotal or marginal 
areas (Case, 2001; Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002). The Cox-McCubbins 
hypothesis that expenditures are instead concentrated in majority party 
strongholds, thereby benefi ting core voters, has received empirical 
support in some US studies (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2003; Levitt  & 
Snyder, 1995; Balla et al., 2002), as well as a number of those conducted 
elsewhere (Crisp & Ingall, 2002; Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Weingast, 
2000; Horiuchi & Lee, 2004).
Based on the literature review, it can be seen that there are essentially 
two mechanisms through which subnational government behaviour 
may be linked to political institutions:
- through state representative at the central level (legislative 
bargaining model), and
- through political and ideological partisanship (political 
partisanship model).
DATA SPECIFICATION AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Data Specifi cation
Our study covers the period of 1982-2002 divided into four periods of 
four year (1982-1985; 1986-1989; 1995-1998; 1999-2002) and one period of 
fi ve years (1990-1994). The division of the period was made concordantly 
with the term of the member of parliament. Indeed, the election at the 
national level is held every fi ve years and the cabinet is formed once the 
election result is announced. In Malaysia, during the fi ve-year period, 
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the members of parliament as well as the members of the cabinet hardly 
change. 
The data on state governments’ expenditures and revenues were 
obtained from the State Government Financial Statements which are 
published and made public every year by the Finance/Treasury Offi  ce 
of each state government. The data were combined with political, 
socio-demographic, as well as economic data from other sources. The 
political data were mainly obtained from the Election Report prepared 
by the Election Commission. The data on election results were also 
obtained from the major newspapers of the country. State demographic 
and economic characteristics were mainly obtained from the State and 
District Reports published by the Department of Statistics Malaysia.
Empirical Strategy
The two hypotheses that were tested may be summarised as follows:
H1:  States with the most votes (or the strongest representation) in parliament 
or in the government have relatively higher spending (the legislative 
bargaining model).
H2:  States that share the same ideological leaning as the central government 
have relatively higher spending (the partisanship model).
The empirical specifi cation was thus as follows
Spendingi,t = α.Politicsit + βXit + eit
where Spendingit are log of real per capita expenditure. The variable 
of interest was Politicsit, which represents various political institutions 
susceptible of infl uencing the state government’s spending. Vector Xit 
represents various control variables which are believed determinant in 
explaining the fi scal behaviour of state governments in Malaysia while 
eit represents the disturbance term of our model.
The Variable of Interest
In order to test for the fi rst hypothesis, the following variables were used:
• the number of seats allocated to each states in the parliament per 
capita, and
• the number of members a particular state has in the cabinet per 
capita. 
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The number of seats that are allocated to each state in the parliament 
will represent the level of leverage that a particular state has in the 
parliament, as the more seats a state has, the more infl uence it will have 
in the legislative process. The same argument holds for the number of 
members a state has in the cabinet. A state that is over-represented in the 
cabinet will have more infl uence on the decisions made at the executive 
level. 
For the second hypothesis, the following variables were used:
• the number of seats (for each state) in the parliament won by the 
ruling party per capita, 
• the percentage of state assembly seats won by the ruling party, 
and
• the number of votes obtained by the ruling party. 
 
The three variables were used because the extent of partisanship of a 
state with the ruling party can in a way be measured by the number of 
seats and votes obtained by the ruling party both at the national and 
state level elections. 
The Control Variables
Control variables were introduced mainly based on previous studies on 
the determinant of public expenditures (Ram, 1987; Heller & Diamond, 
1990, Guillaumont & Hua 2000).. 
The control variables included lagged value of the dependant variable, 
log of real per capita revenue (for equation 1), dummy variable 
representing year before election held, gdp per capita, a dummy variable 
for states with petrol revenues, proportion of forest area, proportion of 
“bumiputera” of the total population, urbanisation rate, and proportion 
of population with tertiary education. The income variable is a proxy 
for Wagner’s Law according to which an increase in income will lead 
to an increase in spending. The possible inertia and dynamic process 
underlying the dependant variables were taken into consideration by 
including their lagged values. Besides, lagged expenditure/defi cit may 
be correlated both with current expenditure/defi cit and the political 
outcomes – the level of current expenditure/defi cit may partly be the 
result of last period electoral and fi scal outcomes – and hence can be used 
to test the robustness of the political eff ect. In order to control for the 
needs and expectations of the population in terms of provision of local 
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public goods, it was included in the estimation the urbanisation rate as 
well as the proportion of population with tertiary education. The more 
educated and/or urbanised, the higher their needs and expectations, and 
the higher will the state governments’ expenditures will be. 
Therefore, these two variables should have a positive eff ect on the level 
of expenditure and eventually on the defi cit level. 
Another implication of a higher urbanisation rate however is the 
economies of scale that can be gained in the provision of public goods 
(Mueller 2003). The more urbanised the state government, the cheaper 
it is to provide public goods. In this case, urbanisation rate should have 
a negative impact on the level of state governments’ expenditure (and 
eventually on the defi cit level). There is thus no consensus as to the 
correct sign of the relation between urbanisation rate and fi scal outcomes. 
The proportion of bumiputera (the Malays and natives of the country) 
was included since the Islamic and native laws and customs fall under 
the responsibilities of the state government. Besides, the proportion of 
bumiputera of the total population varies across states (from more than 
95% in states like Kelantan and Trengganu to less than 50% in states 
such as Penang). States with a higher proportion of bumiputera in their 
population will thus incur a higher amount of spending than those with 
a lower proportion of bumiputera. The was also control for the size and 
population of the state. It was expected that bigger and more populated 
states are more expensive to run and thus will lead to higher expenses 
maintained by the state governments. 
Finally, in order to control for specifi c temporal eff ects, it was also 
introduced in the estimation, three time dummies. The fi rst dummy was 
not included since it was already included in the estimation of the lagged 
value of the dependent variable. As discussed above, it was included in 
the model the lagged values of the dependant variables. Consequently, 
the usual fi xed-eff ect model can no longer be used since the estimators 
will not be convergent as the lagged value is correlated with the error 
term. The potential bias is function of 1/T and the intra-individual 
estimator is convergent only in the case where T is big. Given the weak 
temporal dimension of the sample, the bias is potentially big. Besides, 
past spending decisions may infl uence the current political variables as 
well as have some infl uence on current spending decisions, if spending 
patt erns are a trend through time. Consequently, the generalised method 
of moments (GMM) as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) was 
applied. This method will not only help solve the problem of a serially 
correlated error term, but also those of endogeneity. There are two types 
of GMM estimators: (1) the diff erence estimator and (2) the system 
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estimator. A problem with the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that 
lagged levels are oft en poor instruments for fi rst diff erences. Arellano 
and Bover (1995) described how, if the original equations are added to 
the diff erenced system, additional moment conditions can be brought 
to bear to increase effi  ciency. In these equations, predetermined and 
endogenous variables in levels were instrumented with suitable lags of 
their own fi rst diff erences. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Eff ect on State Government Expenditure and Defi cit
The analysis began with the testing the fi rst hypothesis by estimating the 
eff ect of over-representation at the parliament on the state government 
expenditure level. For that, the number of seats allocated to each state 
in the parliament per capita was used. Table 2 summarises the results of 
the estimations.  The table is divided into two segments – one reporting 
the results when GMM diff erence was used (column A to C) and the 
other when the GMM system was employed (column D to F).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (2003)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real per cap expenditures       214.33 216.82 48.45 1421.72
Real per cap revenue           215.13 215.00 7.72 1457.90
Parliament seats PC     10.06 2.44 3.78 18.33
Ruling party parliament seats PC        8.36 3.57 0 17.57
Cabinet member         3.83 2.44 0 11.00
GDP per capita 109.3617 59.50473 23.29815 371.1
Proportion of bumiputera                   67.05 19.03 32.70 98.80
Tertiary education       8.97 4.22 2.00 28.30
Urban rate       40.57 14.30 14.40 101.45
Size        14911.39 24252.63 66.08 94333.10
Population 1366.335 741.8032 161.125 3776.125
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Table 2: The Eff ects of Over-representation in the Legislative and in the 
Executive on State Governments’ Expenditure
GMM diff erence  GMM system
A B C D E F
Political vrbls
Seats in Parl. 
PC
 0.0025    
(0.0432)
-0.0041
(0.0325)
0.0123   
(0.0081)
-0.0022
(0.0065)
Member of 
cabinet PC
16.4259***
(4.7758)
16.5420***
(4.7595)
9.7423***
(2.1120)
10.5827***
(3.5703)
Economic vrbls
Revenue 0.5516*** 
(0.1044)
0.5232***   
(0.1259)
0.5799***   
(0.1245)
0.7857***   
(0.1319)
0.7072***   
(0.1326)
0.7028***   
(0.1151)
Lagged exp -0.0308(0 .1284)
-0.0416   
(0.1219)
-0.0479   
(0.1427)
0.2362***   
(0.0725)
0.2393***   
(0.0686)
0.2451***   
(0.0684)
GDP per capita 0.0001*    (0.0000)
0.0000   
(0.0000)
0.0000   
(0.0000)
0.0000   
(0.0000)
0.0000    
(0.0000)
0.0000*   
(0.0000)
Sociodemo 
vrbls
Malay prop -0.0667   
(0.0462)
-0.0487    
(0.0472)
-0.0465   
(0.04215)
0.0026   
(0.0019)
0.0017**   
(0.0009)
0.0016    
(0.0009)
Urban rate 0.0045   
(0.0073)
0.0124**  
(0.0055)
0.0063   
(0.0051)
0.0033   
(0.0023)
0.0011   
(0.0022)
0.0008   
(0.0020)
Tertiary educa-
tion
0.0213   
(0.0256)
0.0041   
(0.0157)
0.0208   
(0.0173)
-0.0062   
(0.0109)
0.0005  
 (0.0087)
-0.0007   
(0.0105)
Size (0.8786)
(0.6939)
0.6279
(0.5477)
0.6204
(0.5512)
0.0161
(0.0234)
-0.0018
(0.0215) 
-0.0057
(0.0235)
Population -0.1098(0.5978)
-0.6822
(0.5822)
-0.6742   
(0.5824)
-0.1409
(0.0858)
0.0915
(0.0446)
0.1257
(0.0982)
Constant 0.2341   
(0.3376)
0.1997   
(0.1535)
0.2509   
(0.2663)
Hansen p-
value 0.306 0.267 0.275 0.862 0.573 0.719
1st order AC 
(prob)
-2.67  
(0.008)
-2.99
(0.003)
-2.74  
(0.006)
-2.78  
(0.0050
-2.51
(0.012)
-2.43
(0.015)
2nd order AC 
(prob)
1.12
(0.261)
-1.40
(0.163)
     -1.41 
(0.159)
1.12    
(0.261)
-0.81
(0.415)
-0.89
(0.371)
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, signifi cant at 1% 
level***.
As can be seen from the table, when the number of seats in parliament 
was chosen as the primary independent variable, the impact of over-
representation at the parliament level on the expenditure level is not 
statistically signifi cant (column A). The result suggested that a higher 
number of representatives per capita at the legislature will not translate 
into higher spending by the state governments. The same result was 
obtained when the GMM system estimator was used instead (column 
D).
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In column B and D, the number of members in the cabinet per capita 
was used as the primary independent variable. As it was shown in 
the discussion of the political environment in Malaysia, backbenchers 
do not have much power in the legislature as most, if not all, bills 
are initiated by the members of the executive. Furthermore, any bills 
that are tabled in parliament will not necessarily be adopted and 
promulgated by the parliament. As a result, states have much more to 
gain from federal policies when they are well or over-represented by 
the executives. Besides, ministers also have the power of directing porks 
to their constituents without necessarily having to pass through to the 
parliament. This  expectation seemed to be validated by the estimation 
result, since it showed that the coeffi  cient for cabinet member per capita 
is highly signifi cant in both the GMM system and GMM diff erence 
estimators. These estimates indicated that a higher representation by the 
executives leads to higher spending by state governments. 
In column C and F, both the number of members in the cabinet per 
capita and the number of seats in the parliament were introduced 
simultaneously in the estimations. While the former continued to be 
positively associated with the dependant variable, the latt er remained 
statistically non-signifi cant. These results were taken as suggestive of the 
fact that there is relatively less power are in the hand of backbenchers. 
Consequently, the state governments will not be gett ing any signifi cant 
benefi ts if they are over-represented at the parliament.
As far as the control variables are concerned, only the revenue variable 
was found to be statistically signifi cant across the estimations. As for the 
lagged value of the dependent variable, it was found to be signifi cant 
only when the GMM system was used.
Several tests provided evidence for the validity of the model specifi cation. 
The Hansen test indicated that the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
instruments cannot be rejected. Also, tests performed on the diff erenced 
residuals indicated the presence of fi rst-order serial correlation, but the 
absence of second-order serial correlation. 
In order to test for the eff ects of ideological leaning on state government 
spending behaviour, the following variables (fi rst separately and then 
simultaneously) we introduced in the estimations: the number of seats 
(for each state) in the parliament won by the ruling party per capita, 
the percentage of state assembly seats won by the ruling party, and the 
number of votes obtained by the ruling party. The results are reported 
in Table 3. Again, both the GMM diff erence (column A to C) and GMM 
system estimator (column D to F) were used.
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Regardless of the type of the estimator retained, none of these three 
variables were found to be statistically signifi cant. The variables were also 
found to be non-signifi cant when they were introduced in the regression 
simultaneously. These results implied that ideological leaning does not 
seem to have any impact on the state governments’ fi scal behaviour. One 
possible explanation for this is the fact that the same political party has 
been in power in the country since the Independence and it has also 
managed to control more than 2/3 of the seats in the parliament and in 
most of the state assemblies. As a result, being in the same party as the one 
at the central government, does not seem to be valued that much by the 
latt er. However based on these results, it remains unanswerable whether 
some states are punished or rewarded in function of the population 
voting patt ern, since the federal government has in its possession other 
means of aff ecting the state governments and their population without 
this being translated into the state governments’ fi nancial statements.
The eff ects of political variables on the defi cit level of the state 
governments will now be focused upon. The regression is as follows
Defi citit = α.Politicsit + β.Xit + nit                        (1)
where Defi citit is the defi cit level of the state governments. The variable 
of interest is Politicsit which represents various political institutions 
susceptible of infl uencing the state government’s spending. Vector Xit 
represents various control variables which believed are determinant in 
explaining the fi scal behaviour of state governments in Malaysia, while eit 
and nit represent the disturbance terms of the model. The same variables 
as those in the expenditure model were retained, except for the revenue 
variable, which was replaced with expenditure. This was due to the fact 
that to a certain extent it is the decisions made on the expenditure that 
will determine the level of defi cit. 
Table 4 summarises the estimation results when the dependant variable 
was represented by the defi cit level of the state government instead of 
the expenditure level. The same number of estimations as before was 
performed and it was found that practically the same results as in the 
previous estimation were produced. Again, the results indicated that 
over-representation at the executive level is positively correlated with 
the state governments’ defi cit level. States that are highly represented in 
the cabinet will have higher defi cits. The  results also showed that there 
is no signifi cant correlation between the number of representatives at the 
parliament per capita with the state governments’ defi cit level. 
As to the question whether state governments have more defi cit when 
they share the same ideological belongings as the federal government, 
this was tested by including in the estimations the variable representing 
the percentage of votes obtained by the ruling coalition and the one 
representing the percentage of parliament and state assembly seats won
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by the opposition. The results are reported in Table 5.  In all estimations, 
the results showed that there is no statistically signifi cant relation 
between these variables and the level of defi cit of the state governments. 
This signifi ed that state government fi scal outcomes are not dependant 
on whether their population voted heavily for the ruling coalition or not. 
The results of the estimation exercise pointed to the conclusion that what 
matt ers the most for the states in order to obtain extra resources from 
the federal government is to be well represented at the executive level 
of the government. Being over-represented at the legislative does not 
seem to be of any importance given the non-signifi cant impact that it 
has on the state governments’ fi scal outcomes. This can be explained by 
the minimal roles actually played by the member of parliament in the 
country’s decision-making process. 
Table 4: The Eff ects of Over-representation in the Legislative and in the 
Executive on State Governments’ Defi cit Level
GMM diff erence  GMM system
A B C D E F
Political vrbls
Seats in  Parl. Pc 37.4858 (37.9239)
25.7361 
(12.2457)
-6.3037 
(11.7372)
6.3977 
(8.1211) 
Member of 
cabinet pc
6.9878*** 
(.7442)
5.9182*** 
(.6721)
5.1972** 
(1.5605) 
5.0429*** 
(1.9038)
Economic vrbls
Lag defi cit 0.4329 (0.3127)
0.0213 
(0.1791) 
0.1735 
(0.1337) 
0.1648 
(0.1207) 
0.1502 
(0.1160)
Expenditure 0.1363 (0.0614)
0.1212 
(0.0493)
0.0081 
(0.0599)
-0.0201 
(0.0491)
0.0291 
(0.0596)
-0.0311 
(0.0510)
GDP per capita -0.0000 (0.0000)
-0.0000 
(0.0000)
0.0000 
(0.0000)
0.0000 
(0.0000)
-0.0000 
(0.0000)
0.0000 
(0.0000)
Sociodemo vrbls
Malay prop -0.0104 (0.0176)
-0.0079 
(0.0148)
-0.0131 
(0.0116)
0.0009 
(0.0006)
-0.0003 
(0.0007)
0.0009 
(0.0007)
Urban rate -0.0061 (0.0048)
-0.0041 
(0.0035)
-0.0064 
(0.0035)
0.0024 
(0.0023)
0.0001 
(0.0031)
0.0014 
(0.0023)
Tertiary 
education
0.0300 
(0.0198)
0.0213 
(0.0104)
0.0262 
(0.0174)
-0.0083 
(0.0118)
0.0074 
(0.0145)
-0.0076 
(0.0117)
Forest Area 0.2794 (0.6721)
0.0071 
(0.0149) 
0.2583 
(0.5008)
0.0222 
(0.0180)
0.0071 
(0.0149) 
-0.0062 
(0.0149)
Population 0.9434 (0.6678)
0.0589 
(0.0448)
-0.0140 
(0.2521) 
-0.0012 
(0.0093) 
0.0589 
(0.0448) 
0.0826 
(0.0632) 
Constant 0.1275 (0.2715)
-0.0535 
(0.2079)
0.2694 
(0.2711)
Hansen p-value 0.830 0.716 0.978 0.971 0.998 1.000
1st order 
AC (prob)
-0.26 
(0.792)
-0.45 
(0.650)
-0.59 
 (0.558)
-1.34 
 ( 0.181)
-0.80 
(0.424)
-0.73 
(0.468)
2nd order 
AC (prob)
-0.85 
(0.394)
-0.98
(0.328)
-1.13 
(0.260)
-0.79 
(0.430)
-1.13 
(0.257)
-1.10 
(0.271)
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, 
signifi cant at 1% level***
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Table 5: The Eff ects of Ideological Leanings on State Governments’ 
Defi cit Level
GMM diff erence GMM System
A B C D E F G H
Political 
vrbls
Seats cntrl 
by BN pc
-15.4048  
(10.6279)
-2.8662   
(14.4705)
6.4201      
(6.7070)
1.2323   
(6.6363)
Votes obt 
by BN 
-0.0192  
(0.0256) 
0.0028   
(0.0047)    
0.0019   
(0.0021)  
0.0009   
(0.0016) 
States seats 
BN
0.0158   
(0.0362)  
0.0191   
(0.0149)   
-0.0061*  
(0.0032)  
-0.0029   
(0.0036) 
Socio-
economic 
vrbls
Lag def -0.0579   (0.1300)
0.1549   
(0.1570)
0.1669   
(0.1596)
0.0651    
(0.1800)
0.2728   
(0.1003)
0.2498   
(0.0806)
 1.9199   
(3.1201)
0.1927    
(0.1888)
Expenditure 0.1096   (0.0568)  
0.2232   
(0.1137) 
-0.0131   
(0.0794)  
0.0062   
(0.0590)    
-0.0041   
(0.0531)  
-0.0075   
(0.0486) 
-0.0423   
(0.0584) 
-0.0287   
(0.0511) 
GDP per 
capita
-0.0000   
(0.0000)  
-0.0001  
(0.0001) 
0.0000    
(0.0000)  
-0.0000   
(0.0000)   
-0.0000   
(0.0000)  
-0.0000   
(0.0000)  
0.0000   
(0.0000)  
0.0000   
(0.0000) 
Malay prop 0.0261   (0.0248)   
0.0643   
(0.0664) 
-0.0445   
(0.0474)  
-0.0065   
(0.0271)    
0.0006   
(0.0005)   
0.0010   
(0.0008)  
0.0007   
(0.0008)  
0.0009   
(0.0009) 
Urban rate 0.0013   (0.0042)  
0.0033   
(0.0125) 
-0.0039   
(0.0056)  
-0.0019   
(0.0045)    
0.0015   
(0.0027)   
0.0016   
(0.0023)  
0.0014   
(0.0032)  
0.0014   
(0.0029) 
Tertiary 
education
0.0116   
(0.0176)  
0.0169    
(0.0324) 
0.0031   
(0.0174)  
0.0190   
(0.0152)   
-0.0009   
(0.0127)  
-0.0027   
(0.0107)  
-0.0059   
(0.0143)  
-0.0034   
(0.0134) 
Size 0.7578   (0.5357)
0.8741   
(0.5600)
0.8776    
(0.6406)
 0.8450   
(0.7602)
0.0412   
(0.0310)
0.0361   
(0.0286) 
0.0240   
(0.0165)
0.0378   
(0.0278)
Population -0.1304     (0.3388)
-01749   
(0.2675)
-0.1066    
(0.3003)
-0.2266   
(0.6019)
  -0.0315  
(0.0552)
-0.0324   
(0.0540)
 0.0306   
(0.0946)
0.0306   
(0.1210)
Constant -0.0306   (0.1933)
0.4764   
(0.5315)
0.3273   
(0.2058)
0.1129   
(0.2476) 
Hansen 
p-value 0.145 0.176 0.625 0.466 0.465 0.919 0.764 1.000
1st order AC 
(prob)
-1.25 
(0.212)
-0.86  
(0.388)
-1.05  
(0.294)
-1.20  
(0.230)
-1.00  
(0.318)
-0.94  
(0.349)
-1.06  
(0.291)
-1.06 
(0.289)
2nd order AC 
(prob)
-0.54  
(0.587)
-0.09  
(0.926)
-0.50 
(0.618)
-0.84  
(0.402)
-0.84   
(0.402)
-0.78  
(0.437)
-1.01   
(0.312)
-0.98   
(0.326)
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% level**, signifi cant at 1% level***.
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However it remains to be answered as to how does the extra expenditure 
and defi cit of the state governments that are over-represented in the 
executive are fi nanced? The analysis above only revealed that over-
representation at the executive level has changed the incentives facing 
the state governments in making their spending decisions. Thus, it will 
be interesting to examine whether the increase in the state governments’ 
expenditure has been fi nanced by a real increase in their resources or 
simply by a change in their perception of their bailout probability4 by the 
federal governments. It turns out that, for obvious reasons, we cannot 
examine all the channels indirectly or directly through which resources 
can be transferred from the central to subnational level. Thus the 
analysis had been limited to the ones that were believed to be relatively 
important, especially in terms of the amount of money involved namely:
 
- federal grants and transfers,
- federal loans, and
- federal sponsored development projects5.
This estimation strategy was similar to the the employed in the previous 
section, except that some new control variables that might have infl uence 
on the independent variables were included.
In the case of development allocation, the development expenditure of 
state governments was included as a new control variable, since it was 
thought that how much money allocated to a state will depend on its 
previous record of development expenditure. As for federal transfers, 
the control variables are similar to the previous estimations. Finally, 
for federal loans, the list of control variables was supplemented by 
development expenditure and real defi cit, since state governments 
usually use federal loans to fi nance development expenditure as well 
as their defi cits.  The results of our estimations are presented in Table 6.
The results in column A and B indicate that federal transfers as well as 
federal development allocations are signifi cantly correlated with the 
number of ministers per capita by states. These results signifi ed that 
being over-represented at the executive level does increase the amount of 
federal transfers and development allocations received. The estimation 
results were thus consistent with those found in other studies which 
showed that allocation of transfers to subnational governments are not 
determined solely by effi  ciency and equity considerations, but also by 
political motivations of the central government. 
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Table 6: The Eff ects of Political Factors on Several Federal Funds 
Allocations
A
Devel. Allocations
B
Federal Transfers
C
Federal Loans
Cabinet 0.00012**(0.00005)
0.00098*
(0.00049)
-0.00308 ** 
(0.00107)
Parliment seats -0.00021(0.00022)
0.00277
(0.00190)
-0.01759  *** 
(0.00570)
Votes by BN 0.00001(0.00001)
0.00049
(0.00069)
0.00168   
(0.00134)
Year before election -0.00015*(0.00008)
0.00128
(0.00283)
0.00330  
(0.01624)
Lagged depdt. Vrbl 0.44807**(0.15181)
0.93862***  
(0.01890)
Real defi cit -0.00039**   (0.00017)
Real current exp 2.21e-07(1.98e-06)
Development exp 0.00007(0.00019)
0.03562   
(0.02426)
GDP -8.55e-06(6.45e-06)
-0.00011
(0.00008)
-0.00025
 (0.00019)
Urban 0.00008***(0.00002)
0.00014
(0.00018)
-0.00173  
(0.00117)
Population -0.00906***   (0.00188)
0.00724
(0.01359)
-0.07963 ** 
(0.02967)
Size 1.61e-08(1.64e-08)
-6.80e-08
(2.52e-07)
2.41e-08   
(1.01e-06)
Constant 0.06991***(0.01474)
-0.07314
(0.10622)
0.47686  
(0.31420)
Sargan p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000
2nd order AC (prob) 1.14(0.256) 0.91(0.361) -0.47(0.639)
Notes: standard error in parentheses; signifi cant at 10% level*, signifi cant at 5% 
level**, signifi cant at 1% level***.
Surprisingly, contrary to expectations, a negative correlation between 
cabinet members per capita and level of borrowings was found, which 
signifi ed that an over-representation in the executive level leads to a 
decrease in the amount of federal borrowing by the state government. 
It was also found that there as a signifi cant negative correlation between 
representation in parliament and level of borrowing. Similar results were 
w
w
w
.ij
m
s.
uu
m
.e
du
.m
y
 Ĳ MS 16 (1), 261-283 (2009)    279 
obtained when the growth of federal loans as the independent variable 
was used instead. One possible explanation for this is that cabinet 
members as well as the members of parliament may be pressured by 
the minister of fi nance in order for their states of origin to sett le their 
loans with the government, and the state government will in turn be 
pressured by their representatives at the cabinet and the legislature to 
pay back their loans. As a result, the higher a state is represented at these 
two institutions, the higher the amount of their loan sett lement, thus the 
lower their outstanding loans. Besides, it can be argued that since federal 
loans are usually used for specifi c development projects, they will not 
have much impact on the expenditure decisions of the state government.
CONCLUSION
The main objective in this paper was to examine whether state 
governments’ fi scal behaviour in Malaysia can be explained by political 
and institutional factors. More precisely, it was analysed to see whether 
state governments that are highly represented at the legislative and 
executive levels are more likely to have higher expenditure. The eff ects 
of partisanship on the state government expenditure was also analysed.
The estimation results showed that states that are over-represented at the 
executive level tend to have higher spending and defi cits. However, there 
was not any correlation between over-representation at the parliament 
and state governments’ fi scal outcomes. This can be explained by the 
fact that in Malaysia, as is frequently the case in developing nations, 
the legislature is peripheral to the executive in terms of decision-making 
power. Indeed, not only that, the cabinet members initiated all of the 
bills tabled in the parliament and thus, they usually have no problem in 
pushing through their proposals. 
The results also showed that ideological belonging does not have any 
impact on the state governments’ level of expenditure and defi cit. There 
was not any signifi cant correlation between the level of support won by 
the ruling party in state elections and the level of the state governments’ 
expenditure and defi cit. However, these results cannot be interpreted as 
proof that no states have been victimised because of their support for 
the opposition since anecdotal evidences clearly show to the contrary. 
Rather, it is believed that since in the period of study the practice of 
discrimination has been limited to at most two states at a time, it may not 
be signifi cant enough to be captured by the empirical analysis.
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This study also looked into the question of the mechanisms which the 
state governments used in order to fi nance their extra expenditure and 
defi cit. The results found that the amount of federal grants and federal 
development allocations are signifi cantly correlated with the number of 
cabinet per capita by states. This signifi ed that higher levels of expenditure 
and defi cit of the state governments that are over-represented in the 
executive level are partly fi nanced by the higher amount of federal 
transfers and development allocations that they receive from the federal 
government
The policy implication of this study is that any formal rules that may 
be introduced by the government in order to regulate fi scal relations 
in federations will not have a substantial impact on subnational 
governments’ fi scal outcomes if political incentives allow and encourage 
circumventing these rules. One potential avenue of future investigation 
is to further explore the role of political institutions and electoral rules. 
This may provide insight into whether these institutions can be changed 
to provide bett er incentives for fi scal prudence, or how other institutional 
rules can be designed to be impervious to political manipulations. 
ENDNOTES
1.  According to William Safi re (Safi re, 1978, p.553), the phrase 
pork barrel was “probably derived from the pre-Civil War practice of 
periodically distributing salt pork to the slaves from huge barrels”. He 
noted that in a 1919 issue of the National Civic Review, C.C. Maxey 
wrote “oft entimes the eagerness of the slaves would result in a rush upon 
the pork barrel, in which each would strive to grab as much as possible 
for himself. Members of Congress in the stampede to get their local 
appropriation items into the Omnibus River and harbor bills behaved so 
much like Negro slaves rushing to the pork barrel that these bills were 
facetiously styled pork barrel bills and the system which originated them 
has thus become known as the pork barrel system.”
2.  Lowi (1964) classifi ed domestic policy as either “distributive”, 
“redistributive”, or “regulatory”. 
3.  Weingast et al. (1981) wrote that “while it is clear that all policies 
have a geographic incidence of benefi ts and costs, what distinguishes 
a distributive policy is that benefi ts are geographically targeted...
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geography is the hallmark of distributive politics: programs and projects 
are geographically targeted, geographically fashioned, and may be 
independently varied. Importantly, geography is also the basis for political 
organization and representation”.
4.  It is plausible to conceive a situation where no extra resources at 
all have been channeled to the state governments. This is notably 
the case when a minister from a particular state has stood up 
with success for the cause of his constituent when the latt er is in 
a confl ictual situation with the rest of the country. This will then 
give the impression to the state government that its cause is well 
defended at the federal level, and this will in some cases lead the 
state government to be less fi scally responsible as they believe that 
in case of a problem, the central government will not hesitate to 
help. 
5.  The link between an increase of development allocation received 
by states to an increase in their expenditure and eventually their 
level of defi cit may not seem as obvious as the one between federal 
transfers and loans, and the state governments’ fi scal outcomes. 
It can be argued however that by having more federal sponsored 
development projects, state governments will be able to decrease 
their own development expenditure and using this extra money on 
other posts of expenditure that may otherwise be cancelled due to 
lack of funds. It can also be argued that some development projects 
may require some fi nancial participation by the state governments; 
expenditure that may not have existed if there had been no projects. 
Besides, since development projects’ main objective is to develop 
the states, it can be expected that in the future, some fi nancial 
benefi ts can be reaped by the state governments notably in the 
form of higher taxes. It is in expectation of this future increase of 
income that state governments increase their current expenditure.
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